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Focusing on intra-household allocation, we investigate the effects of coffee market 
liberalisation in Uganda. As coffee has traditionally been a male domain, higher 
income from this activity might increase gender disparities. In addition, gender-related 
inefficiency in household production might undermine the positive impact of improved 
incentives. Using data from three household surveys conducted between 1992 and 2006, 
we estimate Engel curves, coffee yield and labour input equations incorporating 
bargaining proxies. We find that income from coffee is increasingly pooled and 
therefore shared more equally among household members. Yet, we can only detect 
partial improvements in production efficiency: bargaining still appears to constraint 
output efficiency and the distribution of household resources continues to follow 
gendered lines. 
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This paper intends to extend the “trade and gender” debate to agricultural economies 
of Sub-Saharan Africa by looking at the gendered consequences of cash crop market 
liberalisation. More specifically, it investigates the effects of coffee market liberalisation in 
Uganda with a focus on intra-household allocation. 
By affecting the households’ production and consumption structure, trade reforms can 
have an important impact upon households’ resource allocation patterns and herewith on the 
existing gender relations. However, the evidence on the gendered effects of cash crop market 
liberalisation is scarce although there is some anecdotal evidence in various policy documents 
for negative effects and the exclusion of women. Furthermore, most gender analyses tend to 
focus on barriers to women from a static perspective and have very little to say on whether 
these barriers have possibly changed although some anthropological evidence points to 
changes in gender roles in East Africa (see for example Silberschmidt, 2001; Dolan, 2001). 
We aim at filling these empirical gaps by investigating the case of coffee in Uganda, a 
country where thorough sector reforms have triggered a substantial supply response. We use 
data from three household surveys conducted between 1992 and 2006 to quantitatively 
examine the gendered impact from coffee production expansion. In order to assess changes in 
the intra-household resource allocation related to changes in coffee income, we examine 
whether the share of coffee income positively (negatively) affects the expenditure shares on 
male (female) goods by estimating Engel curves for a number of more or less gender-specific 
goods. We find that the share of household income derived from coffee had some impact on 
household expenditure patterns in the early 1990s, but that this effect appears to have 
vanished by today. Thus, coffee income seems to be more equally distributed between men 
and women in the early 2000s. As increased income pooling may indicate more cooperative 
household consumption behaviour, we expect men and women to cooperate better in coffee 
production. However, coffee yield and in particular labour input estimations indicate that 
intra-household struggles over resources for coffee production as well as agricultural gender 
roles persist. 
The paper first provides a short review of the literature on gender roles in agriculture, 
intra-household resource allocation and bargaining processes that is relevant to understand the 
transmission channels of trade reform in the rural context. We then present the respective 
methodological frameworks and the empirical results. A final section concludes.  2 
Analytical Background and Previous Findings 
Analysing the gendered welfare impact of trade reforms and increased trade flows in 
the context of a poor agricultural economy requires an in-depth understanding of household 
decision processes. The unitary model of household behaviour provides a useful starting point 
for this discussion. The model assumes that household members behave as if they were to 
maximise a well defined and uniform household welfare function and that within the 
household all resources (land, labour, and capital), and consequently, all production and/or 
incomes from factor markets are pooled. If the unitary model of household behaviour were to 
apply, the gender effects of trade reforms would be negligible because all household members 
would benefit equally from possible efficiency improvements. 
However, not surprisingly, there exists plenty of evidence against the unitary model 
and the resource pooling assumption in particular. For instance, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) 
using data for Côte d’Ivoire from the late 1980s show that the income share earned by female 
household members impacts on expenditure pattern raising expenditure on food and lowering 
those for alcohol and tobacco expenditure, herewith rejecting the existence of income pooling. 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) use more recent datasets for Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, and South Africa to test the income pooling hypothesis and also reject the unitary 
model, yet to different degrees.  
These findings lend support to household models where the household’s interests are 
not pursued via maximising a uniform welfare function. Rather, individuals have diverse 
preferences and household as well as individual welfare result from bargaining struggles over 
household resources. If individuals have diverse preferences there is no a priori reason to give 
up control over individually earned income. In bargaining models there is hence no 
supposition of income pooling within the household. 
Different bargaining models have been proposed in the context of household resource 
allocation. In contrast to the unitary model, cooperative household models allow household 
decision makers to have different preferences. Outcomes of the bargaining process are 
assumed to be Pareto-efficient, which under preference diversity implies that households 
dispose of efficient sharing rules. In other words, they are able to negotiate adequate 
compensations to achieve efficient resource allocations. While Pareto-efficiency has been 
shown in empirical studies of household allocations in developed countries (Bourguignon et 
al., 1993, 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Thomas and Chen, 1994), they have been 
rejected in the rural Sub-Saharan context by various studies. 
For instance, in his examination of farm households in Burkina Faso, Udry (1996) 3 
finds that female plots exhibit substantially lower yields because they are less intensively 
farmed. Due to diminishing returns, households could increase production for example by 
reallocating inputs, primarily labour, from male to female plots. This implies that prevailing 
bargaining processes, i.e. sharing rules and negotiated compensations, do not lead to efficient 
outcomes. The lack of such processes is also documented by Jones (1983) who provides 
evidence from North Cameroon. Her findings suggest that married wives do not allocate 
enough labour to rice production due to inadequate compensation. Again, both men and 
women would gain if married women were compensated for allocating less time to “their” 
sorghum and more time to “men’s” paddy rice production. In a slightly different setting, Udry 
and Duflo (2004) analyse cooperative behaviour in Ivorian households using panel data from 
1985-1988. Assuming that efficiency requires household members to insure against short-
term income fluctuation due to rainfall, they reject Pareto efficiency. Moreover, in a recent 
study using rural Ethiopian data from the late 1990s and applying a variety of stochastic 
efficiency estimations, Seebens and Sauer (2007) find that relative bargaining asymmetries 
within the household as captured by the distribution of land and livestock brought to marriage 
impact adversely on the household efficiency in production. 
Taken together, quite some evidence has been accumulated against both Pareto-
efficiency and income pooling, particularly in agrarian settings. Thus, at least partly non-
cooperative behaviour within rural households seems to prevail. 
These results maybe explained by the following three factors that often complicate 
negotiations in the Sub-Saharan African context: First, household members typically jointly 
contribute to agricultural production. While wages of individual household members, as in 
more developed economies, are easily observed, this does not hold for individual marginal 
agricultural product. Second, the number of tasks is much larger in poorer countries. On top 
of agricultural and non-agricultural activities, it includes the labour-intensive production of a 
number of household public goods, such as water fetching, cooking or herding. These 
activities would need to be taken into account when compensation agreements are achieved. 
Third, households have to negotiate under strong cultural gender roles, for example the 
exclusion of women from certain agricultural activities. 
Obviously, intra-household processes and changes therein are of utmost importance 
for an evaluation of the gendered impact of trade reform (Alderman et al., 1995, 1997). Yet, 
there are very few empirical assessments of changes in bargaining processes and gender roles, 
less so in response to policy shocks. One exception in this regard is Newman’s (2002) study 
on the gendered impact of increased female employment in the cut flower industry in 4 
Ecuador. She reports important behavioural change and finds a reallocation of housework to 
husbands due to increased bargaining power of the wives in cut-flower regions. 
For the Ugandan case, there is in general very little evidence on the gendered impact 
of trade reform and, in particular, coffee market liberalisation. Some rather anecdotal 
evidence of the effects can be found in policy documents (Baden, 1993; Elson and Evers, 
1996; World Bank, 2005). Elson and Evers (1996: 21) for example suggest that “the 
economic reform programme has not only failed to reduce […] gender distortions and barriers 
– it has intensified many of them”. 
Although there is a lack of evidence on the effects of reforms it seems to be fairly well 
established that coffee production in Uganda relies heavily on female labour inputs in the 
production process while marketing and control over coffee income lie in male hands 
(Bantebya and Keniston, 2006; Elson and Evers, 1996; Evers and Walters, 2001; Evers and 
Walters, 2000; EPRC, 2007; Kasente, 1997). The gender division of tasks is not limited to 
cash crop production. The production of food crops as well as the specific tasks in the 
production of other crops, for example weeding, typically falls into the female domain 
(Kasente et al. 2000; Dolan, 2001). In addition, men exert control over their spouses’ labour 
to some extent, a tradition also reflected by the practice of paying a bride price (Evers and 
Walters, 2001). Finally, women bear the burden of housework, which, beyond domestic tasks, 
comprises a number of time-consuming duties. 
In light of the nature of gender relations and the above discussion of intra-household 
decision-making, it may be instructive to think about two scenarios when considering policy 
change that leads to higher cash crop, here coffee, prices. First, assume there is no change in 
intra-household decision-making; then, higher incomes from coffee may result in increased 
struggles over household resources. By controlling a higher share of household income, male 
bargaining power might even become stronger, a mechanism that would hence reinforce 
existing bargaining asymmetries. More income under male control may bias expenditure 
patterns towards higher consumption of male goods, some of which may even be harmful to 
other household members’ welfare, such as higher alcohol and tobacco consumption. 
Moreover, increased male bargaining power could be used to exert pressure on female labour 
to contribute more labour to cash crop production, thereby squeezing women’s labour time 
(Elson and Evers, 1996). In extreme cases, more intense bargaining struggles may even cause 
a higher incidence of domestic violence. 
Yet, in a second possible scenario instead of favouring the male position within the 
household, increased coffee income might increase the importance of the female participation 5 
in the production process, which might raise women’s relative bargaining strength and lead 
household negotiations towards more equitable compensation agreements. Alternatively, 
other socio-economic changes, especially the increased market participation of farmers as 
well as the growing importance of non-agricultural income sources in rural areas in Uganda 
(Kappel et al., 2005), may generally lead to female empowerment and cause a modification of 
the household allocation rules (Haddad and Reardon, 1993). Together, these different facets 
of possible change in household decision-making processes would tend to move households 
towards more cooperative behaviour, thereby increasing the likelihood of efficient bargaining 
outcomes. 
It certainly remains difficult to identify the precise causes of changes in household 
allocation rules. Yet, it may be less important why exactly the rules change, but whether they 
are subject to change. In other words, what matters is whether women are excluded from the 
benefits coffee income. In the following, we therefore attempt to trace empirically possible 
changes in Ugandan households’ resource allocation rules during a period of remarkable 
economic transformation and structural change. 
Household Survey Evidence from Uganda 
Coffee sector deregulation was one of the core pieces of Uganda’s economic reform 
programme of the 1990s.
2 Overall, coffee sector reforms have been judged successful in a 
number of studies as they have triggered a considerable supply response, which improved the 
living standards of coffee farming households (Baffes, 2006; Bussolo et al., 2007). Whether 
this positive account still holds when coffee sector reforms are assessed from a gender 
perspective will now be examined drawing upon three survey datasets: the Integrated 
Household Survey (IHS) of 1992/93, the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) of 
1999/2000 and the UNHS of 2005/06, which were made available by the Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS). In contrast to most existing studies on gender relations, the use of these 
relatively comparable datasets allows us to examine behavioural change.  
Coffee income is increasingly pooled 
Based on these surveys, we examine the effect of the coffee income share on 
household expenditure over time. If coffee income is indeed controlled by males and we 
assume that men tend to favour private over public consumption, we expect it to bias 
                                                 
2   See the chapters of Reinikka and Collier (2001) for different aspects of the reforms. Further discussions 
include Dijkstra and van Donge (2001) or Okidi et al. (2006). Details on the coffee sector reforms can be 
found in Akiyama (2001). 6 
expenditure toward male consumption goods. In other words, the following empirical analysis 
tries to assess whether and to which extend coffee income is being pooled. Similar to 
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), we estimate Engel curves for a number of goods following 
Deaton’s (1989, and Deaton et al., 1989) specification, originally introduced by Working 
(1943): 
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where total household expenditure is expressed as x and the number of people in the 
same household as n. wi is the expenditure share on good i, which is linearly related to the 
logarithm of the household per capita expenditure (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), 









n γ ; 
that is, the proportion of household members in demographic group j. z simply comprises 
additional information presumably influencing the overall expenditure pattern, such as the 
educational level of the head of the household or the “type of community” (Working, 1943: 
48).
   The expenditure functions have been estimated for each survey following Deaton’s 
specification with only minor modifications. According to Appleton et al. (1999) we altered 
the demographic categories and include some additional variables, such as urban, regional, 
and month dummies, to capture income fluctuations, expenditure seasonality and regional 
price variations. 
The primary variable of interest in the analysis is the household’s income share out of 
coffee production, cof. As reported above, while women are greatly involved in the coffee 
production process (harvesting, seeding, etc.), men dominate selling activities and thus 
typically control coffee proceeds (EPRC, 2007). These reports are being put to test in a 
quantitative framework in the following. 
To capture the importance of bargaining processes beyond coffee income, we include 
a dummy capturing male or female ‘excess education’ while at the same time controlling for 
the educational level of head and spouse, respectively.
3 We test a range of other possible 
bargaining proxies that could be constructed for all survey years, including, for example, age 
differences between heads and spouses as well as variables related to women’s age at giving 
birth to their first child. However, given the problems arising in the construction and 
                                                 
3   The male/female ‘excess education’ variables are dummy variables which equal the value of one for those 
households having an educational disparity between head and spouse that exceeds a threshold of five years 
for males and four years for females. In case of polygamous households, the educational level of the wife 
with the highest educational achievement has been chosen for the calculation. Female-headed household 
heads are excluded. The sub-sample formation is discussed in more detail below. 7 
qualitative adequacy of these variables,
4 it is not surprising that these alternative proxies do 
not yield any further insights and will therefore be disregarded in the following. 
Being less concerned with comparability between years, we additionally draw upon 
particular questions asked in the surveys of 1999/2000 and 2005/06, respectively, to construct 
more adequate bargaining proxies. For 1999/2000, we use information on the inheritance 
rules applied in each community, i.e. we know which household or family member typically 
inherits the parents’ (fathers’ or mothers’) land and other assets.
5 We aggregate this 
information by creating dummy variables for communities where rules exclusively favour 
women or men, respectively. Even more interestingly, the 2005/06 survey asks farmers: 
“Who mainly manages/controls the output from this parcel among the household members?”
6 
Based on this question, we construct dummy variables indicating whether output (from all 
parcels of the household) is controlled only by the head or only by the spouse. 
We analyse for each survey the budget shares on tobacco and alcohol since these 
clearly represent male goods. Supposed female expenditure categories include women’s and 
children’s clothing. Moreover, the budget share on beef (proxied by the aggregate expenditure 
share on beef and goat meat) and meat (also including poultry), considered to be male 
expenditure items, are analysed.
  
For the sake of homogeneity, we reduced the nation-wide surveys by dropping urban 
areas and the Northern part of the country.
7 Based on these geographically reduced samples, 
we estimate Engel curves using different sub-samples. Obviously, bargaining problems as 
stated above will not apply to female headed households, households with no female spouse 
at all and might be altered in a fundamental manner for polygamous households. For coping 
with these different structures we first drop households not having a spouse and include a 
female head dummy into the estimation. The second sub-sample then excludes female headed 
households altogether, while the third leaves only male-headed coffee farmers with a female 
spouse. Polygamy is taken into account by including a dummy variable for households headed 
by husbands with multiple spouses. Given the relative robustness of the results across the 
different sub-samples, we only report the results of the preferred specification that is based on 
the sample excluding female-headed households and male headed households without a 
                                                 
4   For instance, the Ugandan surveys do not allow assigning children to their biological mother. 
5   In some communities, the community leader decides on inheritance matters. 
6   It should be noted that information is given only for parcels (27 percent of farm households have one parcel, 
34 percent have two parcels, and another 21 percent have three parcels), not for plots or even crops. Maybe 
somewhat surprisingly, there is quite some variation in control over parcel output. In only about a third of 
male-headed farms all parcels are controlled only by the head, in a fifth even all parcels mainly by the 
spouse, and in more than 40 percent of farm households is output controlled/managed jointly. 
7   The latter region has been shown to suffer from adverse agricultural conditions and to be largely de-linked 
from the rest of the economy. 8 
female spouse.
8 Given the great amount of zero observations due to the non-consumption of 
these goods during the survey we estimate Tobit models. The results are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using robust estimates. 
Turning to the key variables of interest, Table 1 highlights that the coffee income 
share impacts positively, and significantly, on the expenditure share of alcohol and negatively 
on children’s and women’s wear in the early 1990s, but loses its statistical and lessens its 
economic power for the subsequent survey years.
9 This implies that higher proceeds from 
coffee have not been associated with a disproportionate increase in household expenditure on 
‘male consumption goods’. Thus, during the 1990s income from coffee appears to have been 
increasingly pooled. 
Table 1: Impact of coffee share and other bargaining power proxies on expenditure patterns, 






0.0329* -0.0103 -0.00424 -0.0122** 0.0141 0.00495
(0.018) (0.019) (0.0028) (0.0053) (0.015) (0.015)
0.0102 0.00483 -0.00198** -0.00493*** -0.000292 0.00294
(0.0078) (0.0076) (0.00097) (0.0019) (0.0056) (0.0055)
-0.0182 -0.0149 0.00350** 0.0112*** -0.0136* -0.0110
(0.012) (0.011) (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0075) (0.0071)
-0.00622 -0.0224 -0.00477* -0.0116*** -0.0150 0.00246
(0.025) (0.019) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.022) (0.023)
0.0104 0.0146** -0.000495 0.000752 -0.00831 -0.0110
(0.0085) (0.0062) (0.00086) (0.0011) (0.0079) (0.0082)
-0.0173 -0.00534 -0.0000183 0.000853 0.00380 -0.0101
(0.015) (0.0097) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.0565* -0.00552 -0.00522* -0.00615 -0.0438 -0.0218
(0.034) (0.019) (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.030) (0.028)
0.0181* 0.0153** 0.0000555 0.00231* -0.00192 0.000553
(0.010) (0.0067) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0074) (0.0069)
-0.0135 -0.00511 0.00252 0.00307** 0.0194* 0.0183




















Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Robust standards errors in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Full regression results are reported in Appendices 1-3. 
The ‘educational excess’ variables have the expected sign in most cases and 10 of the 
36 coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results can be taken as 
an indication that relative bargaining power in terms of education does play some role in 
                                                 
8 Further restricting the sub-sample to include only monogamous households with children does not affect the 
results. It should be noted that estimates based on the entire sample – including a female head dummy 
variable – yield a negative effect of the coffee income share on both women’s and children’s clothing also for 
the most recent survey. Although the effects are weaker than in earlier years, this may be taken as indication 
that men in coffee-farming households are somewhat more powerful in general. The additional regression 
results can be requested from the authors. 
9 Full results can be found in Appendices 1-3. 9 
household expenditure decisions.
10 With regard to this variable we do not observe a particular 
time trend or any indication that the nature of the bargaining process had followed a certain 
path. Yet, while the polygamy dummy has a negative and significant impact on alcohol and 
positive impacts upon women’s wear in 1992 and 1999, respectively, it does not exhibit any 
significant impact upon any expenditure share in 2005 (see Appendix 1-3). This might be 
interpreted as a sign of cultural change. 
Finally, we use the information on control over output in the most recent available 
survey to examine whether we can detect the supposed pattern of male control over coffee 
income, which then would be somewhat at odds with increased income pooling. Table 2 
shows the shares of farms where parcels are either all managed/controlled by the male head, 
by the female spouse, or jointly. We find farm households that cultivate coffee to 
manage/control agricultural output jointly much more frequently than non-coffee farms. We 
also checked whether this pattern varies with the degree of intercropping, but it does not: even 
output from almost pure coffee parcels typically appears to be controlled jointly. 
Table 2: Control over agricultural output, 2005/06 




No coffee 0.38 0.24 0.38
Coffeefarmer 0.33 0.15 0.52
Total 0.36 0.20 0.43
Control of output from all farm households' parcels
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The table only considers male-headed households. 
Unfortunately, comparable data is not available for earlier years, but the high share of 
jointly managed/controlled coffee parcels today – taken together with the income pooling 
results and the wide-spread perception that coffee-income is (or has been) male-controlled – 
may be interpreted as a sign that production modes have been subject to change. 
More cooperation in coffee production? 
The above results point towards increasing coffee income pooling since the early 
1990s. Consequently, one would expect household members to cooperate better in production, 
herewith raising production efficiency. 
In order to test whether this was actually the case in Uganda, we estimate coffee yield 
                                                 
10 Both variables constructed from the survey-year-specific information, the ‘gender-biased inheritance rule 
dummy’ for 1999/2000 and the ‘output control dummy’ for 2005/06, yield similar results. 10 
equations for the years 1999 and 2005.
11 Our specification combines Udry’s (1996) approach 
for detecting output inefficiencies due to gendered plot ownership and Lim et al.’s (2007) 
analysis of the importance of female bargaining power on coffee production. Our bargaining 
proxies are the already introduced male and female ‘excess education’ variables, the proxy for 
gender-biased inheritance rules (for 1999/2000) and the dummies for male-head or female-
spouse controlled parcels (for 2005/06). It is important to note that the ‘educational excess’ 
dummies are somewhat more problematic in the production than in the consumption context 
since they also reflect relative comparative advantages of individual households members, for 
example, in non-farm activities vis-à-vis work on the field. 
We expect bargaining asymmetries captured by those proxies to lead to less 
cooperative production behaviour and inefficiencies. In general, production decisions should 
be taken in accordance with price signals and endowments to achieve efficient allocations. If 
influenced by bargaining processes, such influence will lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
More specifically, the female power proxy may negatively affect coffee yields since a 
woman may use her bargaining power to reduce labour input into male-controlled coffee 
production. However, as suggested by the analysis above, men seem to have lost control over 
coffee income to a certain extent, which could in principle be interpreted as a change in the 
compensation for increased female labour input into coffee production. An improvement in 
the compensation rule in turn ought to render relative bargaining power less important in 
determining productive resource allocation, thereby increasing production efficiency. The 
effect of male bargaining power is theoretically ambiguous. Coffee production might benefit 
from men using their relative strength to force or convince their spouses to contribute to it, 
nonetheless leading to an inefficient outcome. 
As in the previous estimations, we use the geographically reduced sample, which is 
further restricted to male heads being classified as coffee farmer and having a spouse. The 
results (reported in Appendix 4) illustrate that coffee output to the area devoted to its 
production is inversely related to plot size. While the first and second production area sixtiles 
positively affect output in both years of examination, the last three are associated with output 
declines although not in a statistically significant manner (with the third sixtile being chosen 
as reference category). This might be explained by decreasing returns to scale or, 
alternatively, by phenomena such as rigid cost structures (Udry, 1996). Additional controls 
include land quality, approximated by the value of the land parcel (per acre), agricultural 
                                                 
11   Unfortunately, the 1992/93 survey does not comprise information about coffee plot size and does not allow 
for an estimation of yield equations. 11 
assets, the number of male and female prime age adults, a dummy for the application of 
manure, the coffee area as a share of total cropped area, a dummy for intercropping, and 
dummies for head’s and spouse’s educational achievement. 
Table 3: The impact of bargaining proxies on coffee yields, excerpts from yield estimations for 












-57.03 32.08 20.44 -29.64
(68.5) (68.8) (41.0) (29.1)
-253.7** -111.0* -140.2** -35.56





Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Robust standards errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Full regression results are reported in Appendix. 
As shown in Table 3, the static effects of the bargaining proxies correspond to 
expectations. In all estimations, female bargaining power has a negative effect on coffee 
yield. The effect of male bargaining power proxies is ambiguous across specifications and 
years and not significantly different from zero. Between 1999 and 2005, these relationships 
seem to become slightly weaker. For 2005, it does not make a significant difference in yield 
when output from the coffee plot is controlled only by the male head or only the female 
spouse. Yet, coffee production decisions may hence still influenced by bargaining proxies, 
which can be taken as a sign for the presence of inefficiencies.
12 
These results rest on relatively weak empirical grounds as the number of comparable 
control variables available in both surveys is limited. In particular, the 1999/2000 survey does 
not report labour input by plot, a key determinant of agricultural output. The more recent 
2005/06 survey allows for a more detailed analysis since it provides information on male, 
female, child, and hired labour input as well as non-labour input by plot. Furthermore, farmers 
were asked about the share of intercropped crops while the 1999/2000 survey only ranks the 
crops according to relative importance. For the year 2005, we can hence estimate an 
‘augmented’ coffee yield equation, the results of which are reported in Appendix 5. Once we 
control for different types of labour input, quantity of applied manure as well as the 
intercropped share and the respective intercrop, the effect of neither female nor male 
                                                 
12   We would not want to put too much emphasis into the strength of the effect between the two years in light of 
the large variations in the other coefficients, which could for example be due to differences in questionnaire 
design. 12 
bargaining power proxied by plot control turns out significant. 
If control over the proceeds from coffee does not affect coffee yields, intra-household 
compensation mechanisms seem to allow coffee-farming households to achieve Pareto-
efficient allocations. Such a mechanism would for example link plot control to the respective 
labour contribution. In order to examine this bargaining process more closely, we additionally 
estimate labour input equations for male, female and child labour. We regress labour input 
into coffee production on the same set variables as in the yield equation including the plot 
control dummy. The results (reported in Appendix 5) highlight the gendered nature of 
agricultural production. While intercropping with female crops, for example root and potato 
tubers, increases female labour inputs, intercropping with other cash crops, such as cocoa or 
tea, is associated with higher male labour inputs. As expected, male control over output is 
associated with higher male and lower female labour input. If output from the plot is 
controlled by the female, males contribute significantly less labour to this plot. Yet, females 
do not put significantly more labour effort on plots controlled by them. These findings show 
that output control and labour input are indeed linked. While the ‘augmented’ coffee yield 
equation from above suggests no influence of bargaining processes on coffee yields, and 
hence Pareto-efficiency, the asymmetries between male and female-controlled plots point 
towards inefficiencies in the compensation mechanism. A final judgement on whether these 
results reflect an efficient compensation mechanism has to be left to future research. 
Taken together, the results on coffee production suggest bargaining processes, in 
particular over labour allocation, may still undermine production efficiency. Yet, in the most 
recent survey, we find no significant impact of bargaining proxies in the ‘augmented’ yield 
equation for the most recent survey and, as indicated above, control over coffee output is on 
average more equally distributed between husband and wife than control of other crops. The 
empirical analysis hence also gives some hints at more cooperative household behaviour in 
coffee production. 
Conclusion 
This paper analyses the impact of coffee market liberalisation from a gender 
perspective in Uganda between 1992 and 2006. The estimation of Engel curves including the 
coffee income share as male bargaining proxy reveals that income has been increasingly 
pooled. Hence, in the Ugandan context higher proceeds from coffee did not increase male 
welfare disproportionately, but appear to have been shared more equally among household 
members. Increased pooling of coffee income should be reflected in more cooperative 13 
behaviour in production. Unfortunately, the data at hand may be too imperfect to arrive at a 
firm conclusion in this regard. Yet, the detailed analysis of coffee production for the most 
recent survey suggests that rigid gender roles and struggles over resources persist in the 
Ugandan agricultural context. These phenomena can be an obstacle to increasing agricultural 
efficiency, especially in the cash crop sector. Yet, given the strong public as well as academic 
perception of coffee as a “male crop”, our results may also be taken as an indication that 
households might have moved towards more efficient compensation rules. 
Overall, the opportunities created by liberalised markets and a growing economy 
appear to have provided incentives for households to move towards more cooperative 
consumption behaviour or has, at least, altered their consumption allocation rules. However, it 
is likely that coffee market liberalisation alone plays only a minor role in explaining 
behavioural change as it is deeply embedded in the cultural and social structure of Uganda. 
This becomes particularly apparent in our analysis of household production processes. 
Therefore, one has to be prudent about drawing general conclusions from the Ugandan case, 
but there is no a priori proposition that cash crop liberalisation leads to a strengthening of 
existing bargaining asymmetries. 14 
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Appendix 2: Engel-curve estimates for 1999/2000 
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Appendix 4: Comparable coffee yield estimations for 1999/2000 and 2005/06 
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14.89 38.36 -19.69 3.119
(55.1) (49.5) (33.8) (28.7)
47.06 49.39 -42.22 -18.09
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-129.2 -129.8 8.785 14.78
(93.7) (92.8) (41.5) (42.9)
-144.7 -132.5 -53.13 -33.40
(102) (101) (37.1) (40.1)
-192.3* -181.1* 13.00 17.41
(101) (101) (48.0) (49.6)
5.921 7.788 16.62*** 18.28***
(6.70) (6.97) (4.33) (4.45)
117.6 107.6 27.86 39.58
(98.1) (97.9) (39.8) (39.0)
159.0* 146.5 94.76*** 97.30***
(95.7) (94.9) (36.0) (37.1)
157.2 162.9* 78.49* 70.45
(97.8) (97.5) (41.4) (43.0)
-404.5*** -419.1*** -110.2** -124.0**
(111) (113) (49.1) (50.9)
-13.73 -17.47 -139.2*** -136.4***
(41.4) (41.7) (47.0) (47.1)
99.72 94.23 10.75 23.07
(71.8) (72.8) (32.2) (37.5)
-57.03 32.08 20.44 -29.64
(68.5) (68.8) (41.0) (29.1)
-253.7** -111.0* -140.2** -35.56
(104) (59.4) (59.3) (36.1)
451.6*** 463.4*** 258.8*** 243.3***
(157) (155) (77.1) (75.3)
Observations 931 933 926 928




Area under coffee sixtile 1
Area under coffee sixtile 2
Head completed secondary or higher




Area under coffee sixtile 4
Area under coffee sixtile 5
Land quality
Agricultural asset quartile 2
Area under coffee sixtile 6
Constant
Agricultural asset quartile 3
Agricultural asset quartile 4
Male more powerful
Female more powerful





Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Agricultural assets in 2005/06 include a broader class of assets. 22 











































Share intercropped with 
tea/cocoa
Constant
Share intercropped with 
root tubers
Share intercropped with 
tree fruits
Share intercropped with 
matoke
Share intercropped with 
sweet banana
Share intercropped with 
cotton/tobacco
Share intercropped with 
potato tubers
Share intercropped with 
other plants
Share intercropped with 
grains
Share intercropped with 
beans or peas
Share intercropped with 
other legumes
Share intercropped with 
vegetables
Spouse completed secondary 
or higher
Head completed higher





Area under coffee sixtile 1
Manure in kg
Area under coffee sixtile 2
Area under coffee sixtile 4
Area under coffee sixtile 5







Agricultural asset quartile 2






Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  23 






























































Observations 912 921 916
R-squared 0.27 0.15 0.42





Head completed  higher
Spouse completed primary
Spouse completed secondary or higher
Coffee area as share of total cropped area
Area under coffee sixtile 6
Male adults
Children between 6 and 14
Share intercropped with grains
Share intercropped with beans or peas
Plot intercropped
Area under coffee sixtile 1
Area under coffee sixtile 2
Area under coffee sixtile 4
Share intercropped with tree fruits
Share intercropped with tea/cocoa
Area under coffee sixtile 5
Share intercropped with root tubers
Labour input per acre
Output controlled by male head
Share intercropped with vegetables
Share intercropped with matoke
Share intercropped with sweet banana
Share intercropped with other plants
Share intercropped with cotton/tobacco
Share intercropped with potato tubers
Share intercropped with other legumes
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  